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The Physician-Patient Privilege in Ohio
G.NERAL
The privilege of patients not to have their communications
to physicians used against them is purely a creature of statute; this
form of privilege was unknown at common law. Nor is this privilege
recognized in the absence of statute. This form of privilege is closely
modeled after the attorney-client privilege that was universally rec-
ognized at common law. In Ohio both the physician-patient and the
attorney-client privileges are set forth in the same statute, General
Code Section 11494. This statute makes privileged all communi-
cations made by a patient to his physician in that relation, and the
physician's advice to the patient.
Unlike the common law privileges, there seems to be no re-
quirements that the communication be made in privacy or it Will
be considered that the privilege is waived. Of course the testimony
of the third parties present is not privileged.' This will on con-
sideration seem reasonable as the subject of the communication is
more than words and may not be fully understood by the third
party so as to negate the effect of the privilege. As to communi-
cations to the agents of a physician such as nurses, the earlier
determinations regarded these as privileged.2 A later determination
of the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the usual rule of
statutory construction should be applied to the privilege section,
to the effect that statutes in derogation of the common law shall be
strictly construed and no privilege is recognized in the situation
of communications to nurses.3
WHEN PRIVILEGE EXISTS
For there to be a privilege, the communication must be made
to a physician, not a veterinarian, chiropractor, or nurse;4 and
it must be within the professional relation. This relation is a con-
sensual relation, the purpose of which is to improve or preserve the
health and well-being of the patient. Though the consent of the
patient is necessary, it may be implied from the facts surrounding
the commencement of the relationship as the patient may well be
brought to the physician in an unconscious state.5 When, however,
I Ryan v. Industrial Commission, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 72 N.E. 2d 907
(C. of JA 1946).
2 Humble v. John Hancock Life Insurance Co., 28 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 481
(C. P. 1931).
3 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 417, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947).
4 Weis v. Weis, supra note 3.
5 Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E. 2d 266 (1942).
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the employment and examination are made against the will of the
patient, there is no privilege; for there is no physician-patient re-
lationship. 6 The fact that the physician is the employee of a third
person does not exempt the resulting relationship from the privi-
leged category even when the third party is the patient's employer7
A communication that is not in the professional relation is not
privileged;s such communications are often quests for advice on
family or financial matters.
Voluntary communications to a doctor may not be privileged
because there was not in existence a professional relationship
between the doctor and the patient even though the communications
would fall within an existent relationship. Thus the findings of
the staff pathologist in a hospital are not privileged.9 There is a
substantial conflict over the question of whether or not there is a
privileged relationship arising between the staff doctors of a hospital
and a patient who enters the hospital and does not employ any
physician himself but is treated by the staff as part of the hospital
service. 10
When the physician is employed for a purpose other than
treatment, communications to him are not privileged. When the
party is examined by order of the court, there is no privilege."
Nor is there one when the attorneys of a patient require him to
undergo an examination in order to determine whether he has a
good claim.' 2 The findings of an autopsy surgeon are likewise not
privileged for lack of a professional relation.
EXTENT OF THE PRIVIIGE
The privilege extends to all communications made to the
physician within the professional relation. However, the privilege
does not extend so far as to cover certain communications, such
as advice as to financial matters,13 nor an admission by the
patient that he was negligent in causing his injuries.' 4 Information
6 Wiler v. New York Central R. R. Co., 9 Ohio L. Abs. 403 (C. of A. 1931).
7 Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E. 2d 266 (1942).
S In re Estate of Chase, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 111 (C. of A. 1940).
9 Nelson v. Western and Southern Indemnity Co., 23 Ohio L. Abs. 117
(C. of A. 1936).
10Not privileged: Lumpldn v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 75 Ohio
App. 310, 62 N.E. 189 (1945); Wills v. National Life Insurance Co., 28 Ohio
App. 497, 162 N.E. 822 (1928); contra, Lamarand v. National Life Insurance
Co., 58 Ohio App. 415, 16 N.E. 2d 701 (1937).
11 Sucher v. Burger, 13 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 161 (C. P. 1912).
12 McMillen v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 435, 37 N.E. 2d 632
(C. of A. 1941).
13 In re Estate of Chase, 31 Ohio L Abs. 111 (1940).
14 Dewart v. Cincinnati Milling Machine Co., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 268 (C. of
A. 1933).
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as to the commission of a crime should not be privileged, and an
ordinance requiring physicians to report gunshot wounds does
not violate the privilege. 15
It is communications that are protected by the statute, and the
earliest cases dealing with the privilege were concerned with defin-
ing communications. It was early held that the only communications
protected were the verbal communications of doctor and patient,
and knowledge gained by the physician from his visual examination
of the patient was not privileged.16 However, this view was later
discarded, and the exhibition of the patient's body to the physician
for examination is now considered a communication.17 The statute
makes privileged the physician's advice to the patient though one
early case declared that a physician may testify to the treatment
he gave a patient.'8 This ruling is no longer authoritative. However,
a physician employed to treat the physical ailments of a patient
may testify as to his state of mental health.19
The privilege is one of the patient and not of the physician,
and a physician cannot invoke it for his own benefit. The privilege
applies in all judicial or quasi-judicial hearings, and an administra-
tive tribunal cannot condition its hearing of a case on the waiver
of the privilege by the claimant.20 Documents made by the physician
containing privileged matter are not admissible in court even if
they are semi-public records.2 1
WAIVER
Evidence that falls within the privilege may not be admitted
unless the privilege is waived. The statute provides for waiver only
by the patient by either specifically waiving the privilege or by
taking the witness stand and voluntarily testifying on the same
subject.22 On this question the courts have construed the statute
very strictly. They have consistently required that any waiver
must be by the patient, and this has resulted in permanently seal-
ing the lips of physicians after the death of their patients. In this
question, Ohio has refused to go along with many other states
Is Bolton v. City of Cleveland, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 599 (C. of A. 1924).
16 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Howle, 68 Ohio St. 614, 68 NX.. 4
(1903).
17 Ausdenmoore v. Holzback, 89 Ohio St. 381, 106 N.E. 41 (1914).
18 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Howle, 68 Ohio St. 614, 68 N.E. 4
(1903).
19 Heiselmann v. Franks, 48 Ohio App. 536, 194 N.E. 604 (1934); Olney v.
Schurr, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 630 (C. of A. 1936).
20 State ex rel. Galloway v. Industrial Commission, 134 Ohio St. 496, 17
N.E. 2d 918 (1938).
21 Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 417, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947); Eikenbury v.
McFall, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 525, 36 NX.. 2d 27 (1941).
22 OHIo GEN. CODE § 11494.
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and has refused to permit waiver by a widow, heir, legatee,
executor or other personal representative. 23 Nor may the beneficiary
of an insurance contract issued on the patient's life waive the
privilege. 24
The patient may waive by calling the physician as a witness or
consenting to his being a witness against him and not objecting to
histestimony. The patient may also consent by agreement to a waiver
of the privilege; so a provision in an insurance policy waiving the
privilege is valid.20 The patient may also waive by taking the stand
himself and voluntarily testifying on the same subject. If the
patient's testimony is brought out on cross-examination, ib is not
voluntary.2 6 The term subject is restrictively defined to limit it
to the specific details of the patient's direct testimony.27 In this
regard the physician-patient privilege is more liberally applied
for the benefit of the patient than is the companion attorney-client
privilege.28 In case the patient testifies on the same subject, that is a
waiver to that subject; and any physicians whom he has consulted
may be questioned on that same subject but not on others. If the
patient waives expressly by calling that one physician, the privilege
remains as to all other physicians employed by the patient. It is
not necessary for the patient to waive the privilege before the doctor
can testify as to the existence of the privileged relation or the length
of its duration or the number of visits in connection with it. 9
There remains only one exception to the general rules of waiver,
which is that, in an action for the death of a worker under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow may waive the privilege.
This exception is not included in the privilege statute but is arrived
at from interpreting the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 0
SUMMnARY
Generally there are but three types of cases in which the
physician-patient privilege is invoked; these are actions on policies
of insurance, actions for personal injuries, and actions forWorkrnen's
Compensation. The privilege is also occasionally raised in will con-
23Parisky v. Pierstorff, 63 Ohio App. 503, 27 N.E. 2d 254 (1939); McKee
v. New Idea, Inc., 36 Ohio L. Abs. 563, 44 N.E. 2d 697 (1942).
24 Thompson v. National Life Insurance Co., 68 Ohio App. 439, 37 N.E. 2d
621 (1941).
25 New York Life Insurance Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N.E. 176
(1927).
26 Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E. 2d 776 (1937).
27Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E. 2d 776 (1937); Baker v.
Industrial Commission, 135 Ohio St. 491, 21 N.E. 2d 593 (1939).
2S Note, 4 OIO ST. L. J. 103 (1938).
29 Willig v. Prudential Insurance Co., 71 Ohio App. 255, 49 N.E. 2d 421
(1942).
30 Industrial Commission v. Warnke, 131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N.E. 2d 248 (1936).
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tests in attempting to show the testator's capacity. In will contests
the courts apply the rule of strict construction to the statute, as
a result of which the privilege is often denied. In the three more
common types of actions, however, the privilege usually results
in the exclusion of otherwise material and relevant evidence not
for any weakness of its probative value but because of what Wig-
more calls a rule of extrinsic policy. Any rule of privilege must find
its basis in either the likelihood of biased and untrue testimony
because of the relationship or a public policy of encouraging the
privileged relationship. The privilege of a physician to remain silent
unless the patient's consent to speak is given cannot be based on
any inherent probability of falsehood in the testimony, for indeed
that is more a matter of competency than privilege. The privilege
must be found in the desirability of encouraging the relationship. It
seems foolish to think that anything but the professional vanity of
the physician is encouraged by this privilege, for rare indeed must
be the man who will suffer his illnesses in silence rather than repair
to a physician for treatment.3 L
James D. Hapner
31 See: 8 WIoE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (a) (3rd Ed. 1940) and 58 Am. Jur.,
Witnesses § 402.
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